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An Overview of This Issue:
Closely-Linked Nature of Global Food and Finance
by Siwa Msangi*

T

he tumultuous economic events of the past year have
given us all a stark reminder of the closely-linked nature
of the global food and financial economy, and the ability
of market-level ripple effects to quickly spread from one corner
of the globe to the other. In the case of the food crisis, the origin
and underlying causes of these ripple effects are both diverse
and complex in nature—as they include ‘drivers’ of change that
are both socio-economic and environmental. While the role of
crop-based biofuels in certain OECD countries might explain
part of the rapid increase in prices for commodities like corn, the
underlying causes of rapid increases in rice prices in East and
Southeast Asia stem from a very different set of policies—some
of which, in themselves, helped to magnify the original market shocks, and worsen the effects. Among such policies were
export bans and unilateral trade actions, which tend to allow
less room for flexibility in the system just at the time when it is
needed most, and distort the market signals that might help to
bring about needed corrections and adjustments.
Production-side shocks to food economies were driven by
droughts, floods, or other extreme weather events that coincided
with a much ‘tighter’ set of market conditions in many countries,
where historically abundant stocks of grain reserves had slowly
been run down over time, and demands had slowly been ramping upwards. The relatively low level of global grain stocks is
largely due to either policy neglect or the desire to privatize the
operation of the food system, so that a ‘just-in-time’ principle of
inventory management could be exercised for the sake of efficiency. Some of these changes were driven by the incentives of
structural adjustment regimes, others were brought about by a
more laissez-faire attitude towards how food economies should
be managed and the persistent belief that there’s always plenty
to be had from the market at low prices—which is clearly no
longer always the case.
One of the deficiencies in the world socio-political and economic infrastructure that the food crisis has helped to bring to
light is the widespread lack of compensating mechanisms that
can provide social protection to those most in need of help. The
‘low-hanging’ fruit of price controls turned out to be a favored
policy instrument for many governments eager to suppress the
inevitable discontent that high food prices cause among highly-vocal, urban populations, and who lacked any other form of
social protection programs. These price controls, while easy to
implement, tend to dampen the very incentives and signals that
food producers need to receive in order to boost their output, and
help prices ease towards the lower levels that we’re now beginning to see. When these highly-vocal populations begin to suffer
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the effects of high food prices, they also tend to be more cantankerous and critical of other less-desirable aspects of government
policy—which is why low food prices are often the opium that
poorly-performing governments prefer to give to their constituent masses.
The overall conclusion that we are forced to draw from
these lessons of the recent past is that we live in a much tighter
and more volatile world food market situation, where the failure of certain countries to maintain consistently high exports,
for whatever reason, will result in a rapid escalation of prices
and deterioration of socio-economic welfare for the world’s
poorest and most vulnerable. There may not be the ‘fat’ in the
system that we might have taken for granted in the past, that
might help us to stave off the worst effects of food price volatility for long enough to make the corrective measures needed
to avoid high inflation. As we anticipate the growth of today’s
nearly 6.2 billion people into a global population of over nine
billion in 2050—many of whom will be more wealthy and
sophisticated in their diets and lifestyles—and contemplate the
implications for global food supply, and the constraining effects
of land degradation and climate change, we are given reason to
pause. Malthusian doom is not upon us yet—but we must work
to prevent his herald from appearing. Much work is yet to be
done in strengthening agricultural production, distribution, and
marketing systems in regions which have the worst-functioning
infrastructure, and weak systems of agricultural extension and
research. Multi-lateral effort needs to be applied, at a global
level, to bolster the mechanisms of trade and commerce which
can help smooth periods of turbulence and uncertainty. These
efforts would allow for free movement of goods to where they’re
most needed and valued, but the markets, by themselves, cannot
save us entirely. Good systems of governance and well-targeted
public interventions need to be made to fill in gaps, as they arise,
and step into the widest breaches that might suddenly appear on
the path of development.
Such are the competing (and sometimes conflicting) demands
of governance within these trying and turbulent times—to let the
market-based incentives work when they’re most useful, and to
protect those who are least served by the market at the same
time.
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